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Abstract
This paper analyzes the American pharmaceutical rmspersistence in innovating prior to
a wave of mergers and acquisitions that accompanied the Biotech revolution. We evaluate
the impact of past innovative activity on rms innovation propensities using a non-linear
GMM estimator for exponential models that allows for predetermined regressors and linear
feedback. We nd that innovative activity at the rm level strongly depends on the tech-
nological importance of past innovations. In particular this e¤ect is likely to deter further
pioneering behaviors rather than strengthen non cumulative R&D. Results also shed light
on the importance of small rms in the technological development of pharmaceuticals, and
suggest that large rms mainly persist in using patents possibly for strategic purpose.
Keywords: Patent Citations, Pharmaceutical Industry, Persistence in Innovation.
Ce papier analyse la persistance à innover des laboratoires pharmaceutiques Américains,
antérieurement à la vague de fusions et acquisitions qui accompagna la "révolution des biotech-
nologies". Nous évaluons limpact de lactivité passée dinnovation sur la propension courante
à innover via des GMM non linéaires. Nous trouvons que lactivité dinnovation au niveau
de la rme dépend fortement de la portée de son passé inventif. Plus particulièrement, les
découvertes radicales dépendent fortement de la qualité des innovations passées de la rme
et cet e¤et semble la détourner de comportement pionniers plutôt que linciter à poursuivre
une recherche non cumulative. Les résultats montrent aussi que le niveau de lactivité et le
pouvoir de marché des rmes sont négativement corrélés avec limportance technologique des
innovations faites et ne sont positivement corrélé quavec les dépôts brevets simples. Les petites
rmes apparaissent alors être la principale source du changement technologique tandis que les
rmes plus importantes semblent avoir moins dinuence et pourraient donc utiliser le brevet
à des ns plus stratégiques.
Mots clés: Citations de Brevets, Industrie Pharmaceutique, Persistance à Innover.
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1 Introduction
Ever since Schumpeters initial insights, the questions related to rmse¢ ciency and persistence
in innovating have been a recurrent topic of interest.1 This literature emphasizes the two fun-
damental principles which are epitomized in the Schumpeters "creative destruction" or "creative
accumulation".2 These two principles consider di¤erently the relationship between economic dom-
ination and innovation activity. Which of these two principles dominates the other depends on the
fundamental assumptions that are made concerning the properties of technology specic to rms
or equally accessible to everybodyand concerning the nature of innovative process cumulative
or not(Ces, 2003). Basically the Schumpeter dynamics is such that innovation may lead to new
technologies which undermine old monopoliesposition although dominant rms may also benet
from history to innovate cumulatively.3 Accordingly, size and frequency of innovations are the fruit
of two counteracting forces. On the one hand, the monopolist faces a "displacement e¤ect" which
indicates that rms with high market power will have no incentive to win a patent race too quickly
as their current revenue streams will be displaced by an entirely new one.4 Indeed, entrants may
have greater strategic incentives to invest in fundamental research leading to (radical) innovations.5
Nelson & Winter (1982) and Kamien & Schwartz (1982) labelled this pattern of innovative activ-
ity the "Schumpeter Mark I" in reference to what Schumpeter states in The Theory of Economic
Development (1934). On the other hand, Gilbert & Newbery (1982) and Bud et al. (1993) argue
that large rms are more likely to innovate persistently mainly because of an "e¢ ciency e¤ect".
This e¤ect reports the "persistence of monopoly" as being the extent to which leaders will spend
more on pursuing innovation in order to maintain their dominance (e.g. Scherer, 1967). Dominant
rms may also benet from barriers to entry making them able to be persistent innovators as it
is illustrated in the model of Segestrom & Zolnierek (1999). This pattern of innovative activity is
also known as "Schumpeter Mark II" in reference to Capitalism, Socialism,and Democracy (1942).
1See Scherer (1992), Pavitt (1988), Pavitt & Patel (1994) and Dosi (1988) for detailed discussions on this point.
2For a detailed analysis of these two Shumpeterian models of innovation see Scherer (1992) and Ces (2001)
among others.
3Segestrom & Zolniereck (1999), for example, explain why industry leaders can often devote substantial resources
to R&D by assuming they can improve their own products more easily than can other rms.
4See Arrow (1962), Reinganum (1982, 1983).
5Similar predicitions are found in the organizational theory about the failure of incumbent rms to conduct
radical innovation because of the diseconomies of R&D, inertia, complacency, etc., which makes harder to achieve
returns to radical R&D (see Henderson, 1993).
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The persistence in innovation is thus a key feature of the patterns of technological change.
Despite the importance of this concern there is still few empirical evidences on both the rms
persistence in innovating and there innovationsquality. The aim of this research is thus to ll in
this gap by analyzing the intra-rms technological dynamics of some US pharmaceuticals between
the mid seventies and the nineties. Several questions are thus treated:
i) How persistently rms innovate and with what scope?
ii) Which rms inuence the technological change?
Because innovation is often seen as a black box, this study relies on the use of patent and
patent citation data as a better measure of rmsinnovative activity.6 Patent citations makes it
indeed possible to take into account both the inuence and dependence which a given patent exerts
on, and undergoes from, existing innovations. Such data are particularly pertinent for studying
pharmaceuticals essentially because given the considerable investments they require, drugs are one
category of innovation where the incentive-giving role of patents works best (Arora et al. 2001).
Patenting in pharmaceuticals however remains also very heterogeneous in terms of technological
importance and it is well known that pharmaceutical rms often rely on patents for anti-competitive
practices, notably in order to face competition exerted by generics7 or by other research intensive
rms.8 In pharmaceuticals innovators may thus take out hundreds of patents on marginal variations
of the same basic invention, to erect a patent "fence" to keep unwanted competitors and imitators
out (Davis, 2002).
The papers contributions are twofold. Firstly, by identifying pioneering discoveries and assess-
ing the rmstechnological inuence according to patent citation criteria (forward and backward
citations), we evaluate in detail the rmspropensities to innovate (their inventiveness and their
technological inuence), conditional on their lagged R&D expenditures, internal spillover, amount
of sales and market power then on their various patent stocks (i.e. accumulated knowledge). Sec-
ondly, we evaluate the feedback e¤ects of past innovative activity on the current propensity to
6See Trajtenberg (1990), Hall et al. (2001) and Lanjouw & Schankerman (2002) for studies using patent citations.
7See Langinier (2001, 2004), Arundel & Patel (2003).
8See Lichtenberg & Philipson (2002) for an analysis on the di¤erent competitions ("between" and "whithin"
patents) to which pharmaceutical rms face.
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innovate to assess the role history plays in the rms innovative behavior. Data on patenting
and citations, in addition to rmseconomic data, has been carefully gathered to obtain a unique
unbalanced panel data for 77 traded innovating pharmaceutical rms for the period 1975-91.9
Results indicate that innovative activities are rather persistent but strongly depend on the
technological importance, or value, of past innovations. Most persistent innovative behaviors
mainly concern those innovations having the poorest technological value. Conversely, the techno-
logical breakthroughs are likely to deter further pioneering behaviors in the short run rather than
strengthen incentives to pursue investing in non cumulative R&D. The dynamic of innovation ap-
pears thus to be an important feature of innovative activity in pharmaceuticals. In addition, the
rmslevel of commercial activity and their market power appear to be negatively correlated with
the technological inuence of innovations. Small rms are consequently seen as being the major
sources of technological change in the pharmaceutical industry whereas large rms seem to use
patents strategically to retain sales.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 quickly describes the relevant
literature then lays out the basis for the use of patent citations and their advantages for such
an analysis. Section 3 presents the methodology, the variables and the data employed, Section 4
presents the results and their interpretation and Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
In many empirical works the manufacturing industry exhibits a decreasing R&D productivity
which is particularly accentuated in pharmaceuticals.10 The pharmaceutical industry is one of
the most intensive knowledge sectors, devoting currently more than 20 % of sales to research
and development (PhRMA, 2000). The decline of innovation is such that the average cost to
develop New Chemical Entities (NCE) has risen from $180 million in the eighties up to more
9Even if original data cover 1975-95 we focus on the period 1975-91 for two reasons. Firstly to deal with the
truncation problem related to forward citation lags (see section "Data and Methodology" and for details Hall et al.
2001). Secondly to avoid bias the wave of mergers and acquisitions in the mid 90s (seen as an external acquisition
of knowledge) may induce when analyzing rmsinnovation e¤orts.
10As shown by Dimasi (1991) and Dimasi et al. (1999), pharmaceutical innovation costs have dramatically
increased since the last decade in part due to the stricter rules on clinical trials, in addition to increasing complexities
in technology discovery; see also Henderson & Cockburn (1998) and Cockburn (2006).
4
Gautier DUFLOS: Persistence of Innovation in the US Pharmaceutical Industry
than $800 millions in 2000.11 The regulatory framework may have contributed to some extent
to rising costs which leads to the decline of R&D productivity and an increasing di¢ culty to
bring innovation onto the market. In addition the competition exerted by generics is stronger
and stronger (Grabowski and Vernon, 1990) such that in the eighties they represent half of the
prescriptions on the US market. Furthermore as it takes on average 14 years from laboratory and
animal studies to FDA (Food and Drug Administration) approval (Viscusi et al. 2000), approvals
in 2000 are related to patents which has been granted between 1985 and 1990. Technological
exhaustion (within a dynamics of "creative accumulation") in pharmaceuticals may also explain
such a decline. The emergence of biotechnologies and genomics in the eighties, redened invention
methods for drugs from randomly screening of a large number of potentially useful compounds
towards a more systematic approach called "rational drug design".12 This revolution in the research
methods has therefore induced new challenges to the extent that the NCE are more and more
specic. Analogously, the role played by competitive entrants in comparison to dominant rms
can shed light on the articulation between "creative destruction" and "creative accumulation" in
the discovering of new compounds.
The pharmaceutical industry is also recognized as the sector where the patent is the more e¤ec-
tive and, consequently, the principal industry relying on patents to appropriate returns to R&D and
to exclude technological followers. According to Bruce Lehman (2003)13 , President of the Interna-
tional Intellectual Property Institute, "the pharmaceutical industry is one of three technology-based
industries in which the patent virtually equals the product. The others are the chemical industry
(including agricultural chemicals) and the biotechnology industry". Levin et al. (1984) showed that
a patent is the most e¤ective to appropriate returns in industries with chemical-based technologies,
such as pharmaceuticals, which makes it a very convenient eld for analyses which proxy innova-
tion activity with patent grants. However rms may also be strategically granted many poor
patents as many legal right to excludeto build barriers to entry (foreclosure) or to develop ex-
isting inventions in response to increasing di¢ culties to innovate. To extend market exclusivity on
11Source: Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development (2001).
12This involves exploiting knowledge about the biochemical mechanisms causing a disease to identify or develop
chemicals that inhibit such mechanisms, see Malerba & Orsenigp (2001, 2002) and Adam (2005) for a detailed
description of this transition.
13"The Pharmaceutical Industry and the Patent System" Columbia University Working Paper, 2003.
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blockbuster drugs (those exceeding US$ 1 billion of yearly sales) beyond patent expiration, rms
use a number of strategies in response to the increasing competition of generics, allowed by policies
like the Hatch-Waxman Act (1984), and to the threat of technological exhaustion. Nevertheless,
as suggested by Caballero & Ja¤e (1993) and Lichtenberg (1998), the pharmaceutical industry
remains the sector with the highest rate of creative destruction at the product level. Despite the
fact that less and less pioneering inventions are discovered, leading to an erosion of the number of
new (technologically) promising compounds invented, pharmaceuticals remains the most research
intensive sector (Achilladelis & Orsenigo, 2001; Malerba & Orsenigo, 2001; 2002).
Finally, as pointed out by Griliches (1990), the technological value across patents within a
rms patent portfolio and across rmslargely di¤ers. That explains partly why some studies are
based on innovation surveys rather than on patent data to analyze rms innovation activity.
Innovations surveys present however also some drawbacks inherent to their qualitative approaches.
Notably the denition of innovation, as well as the distinction of its nature (radical or not),
remains subjective and presumably arbitrary heterogeneous. To deal with both of these issues we
thus choose to use patent and patent citations data to assess the rmsinnovation activity.
2.1 Persistence of Innovation in the Literature
A large strand of literature focuses on the persistence with which rms innovate. This literature
investigates whether rms innovate persistently or discontinuously over time and attempts to assess
the extent to which innovation ows within rms are interdependent over time. Contrasting views
are put into light and often underline the role played by nancial resources and/or technological
leadership resulting from past innovation. These are either seen as an advantage to innovate or
as a dead weight which limits future innovative ambitions. We can summarize that the litera-
ture analyzing patterns of innovation agrees on innovative persistence being rather strong among
large innovators and that consequently few persistent innovators account for the large major-
ity of patenting with quite stable ranking. In other words, these studies conrm the theoretical
predictions on persistence only for a restricted group of rms.
In Nelson & Winter (1982) "success breeds success" such that past innovations that meet
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commercial success are a necessary condition to nance R&D and by consequence to innovate
persistently. Analogously, Simons (1995) explains that successful innovations o¤er technological
advantages to innovate thereafter. Thus the cumulative nature of knowledge would induce state de-
pendence in invention ows and consequently persistence in innovation. Considering competition,
Arrow (1962) shows that competitive markets generate greater incentives to invest in innovation
than concentrated ones.14 In the case of free entry, Gilbert & Newberry (1982) show that market
dominant rms will preempt potential entrant investment in innovation which leads to persistence
in innovation activities. Reinganum (1983) however reinstates Arrows results by considering the
case of uncertain innovations. She shows that a monopolist will seek to avoid overlapping in its
product innovation portfolio, and thus will have less incentive to innovate than a competitive en-
trant. From another point of view, Sutton (1991) considers the sunk costs in R&D investments
as an important feature to take into account in studying persistence since they build barriers to
entry and create engagements to continue innovation.
At the empirical level, studies focus on the "creative destruction" and "creative accumulation"
in the technological dynamics (which of the two e¤ects prevails according to competitive circum-
stances and rmscharacteristics). They point out the di¤erences between dominant rms and
competitive entrants in the emergence of new technologies, their improvement and consequently
the innovative interactions at work in the technological path design. Schumpeter initiated many
debates directing researchers towards the questions dealing with the sources of the technological
change but the interaction of market dominance and past innovative activity remains still incon-
clusive. Several cross-sector studies demonstrate an apparent continuity, or persistence, in the
rmsinnovative behaviors and, in general, agreed on the fact that only a few innovators account
for a large share of innovations and do it continuously (i.e. persistence in innovation is weak as
a whole as only a restricted group of rms is concerned). Nevertheless, in almost all cases, the
simple patent count, or the R&D activity, is used to proxy the rmsinnovative behavior excepting
Duguet & Monjon (2004), Peters (2005) and Raymond et al. (2005) who use innovation surveys
to overcome the limitations of patent data.
14See also Aghion et al. (2002) who nd an inverted U relationship between innovation and competition.
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Crépon & Duguet (1997) use a panel of R&D performers and patent data to measure innovation
in France. They estimate a dynamic count data model that estimates the relationship between the
current number of patents to both the previous year number of patent and the amount invested
in R&D. They nd a rather strong persistence in innovation among formal R&D performers.
Marbela & Orsenigo (1999) examine the patterns of innovative entry, exit and survival, using
European Patent O¢ ce (EPO) data for six European countries through a descriptive analysis.
They measure persistence by analyzing the duration of patenting after entry. They found a high
degree of turbulence such as the process of entry and exit seems to support wide changes over
the time in the innovators population. Hence, a large fraction of new innovators is composed
by occasional innovators even if they constitute a signicant part of the whole population of
innovators, despite a lower share in the total number of patents granted.15 Ces & Orsenigo
(2001) conrm the weakness of persistence in innovation in a comparative analysis of six European
countries over the period 1978-93, using a Transition Probability Matrix approach and a Markov
chain that distinguishes "great-innovator" and "non-innovators". They assess the probability of
remaining in the same stage of patenting and found a strong persistence in the rmsinnovative
activity. Firms have thus a high probability of staying in their original state, persistent innovators
being the principal source of technological change. In addition they nd a strong heterogeneity
across rms industry and size. Similar results are found by Ces (2003) who uses the same
methodology for the UK over the period 1978-91 since she nds "little persistence in general, but
strong persistence among greatinnovators that account for a large proportion of patents requested:
innovative activities, at least which are captured by patents, are persistent".16 Geroski et al. (1997),
in a duration analysis (Duration Dependence Weibull Model) that assesses the "patent spells"17 in
UK over the period 1969-88, nd little evidence of persistence at the rm level, even if persistent
innovators account, once again, for a large share of the total patenting. They nd similar results
15On this point Duguet & Monjon (2002) explain that in some activities, few innovators patent their inventions
(see also Cohen et al. (1997), Duguet & Kabla (1998)). Consequently the weak persistence would reect in fact
the weak use of patents in some sectors. In addition patent data would show the persistence of "anteriority" rather
than that one of innovation. However in the specic case of the pharmaceutical industry these assumptions do not
hold.
16 In an earlier version, Ces (1996) already found a weak persistence in general but a strong persistence among
the greatest and the smallest innovator. By distinguishing rms according to their size and sector, she sheds light
on a substantial heterogeneity in the degree of persistence among the rms of the sample.
17 i.e. they dene the degree of innovation persistence of a rm as the number of consecutive years during which
it has a recorded innovative output.
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when considering "major innovations" instead of patent count. Cabagnols (2005) uses the same
data to examine the impact of past patenting the technological accumulationon the rms ability
to be persistent in innovation and nds also a positive and signicant relationship.
Concerning the technological specicity of the innovations patterns, Marbela & Orsenigo (1996)
show that the patterns di¤er systematically across technological classes (referring to Schumpeter
Mark I and II), but are remarkably similar across countries for each technological class suggesting
there is no country specic e¤ect contrarily to sectors. As a result they found that the process
of "creative accumulation" is specic to the electronic and chemical industries whereas the me-
chanical technologies are closer to a process of "creative destruction". This seems to support the
assumption that industries where innovations are primarily based on knowledge (as pharmaceu-
ticals) are more subject to technological accumulation (v.s. pioneering innovation) than others.
Thereafter, Marbella et al. (1997) wonder if persistence and heterogeneity are associated with a
high degree of concentration in the innovative activity and a stability in the ranking of innovators,
or whether they are associated to other variables like the rmssize and industrial concentration.
As results, contrary to the Schumpeterian hypothesis,18 they found that the market structure
doesnt play a clear role in the emergence of innovation while persistence and asymmetry seem to
be the fundamental determining causes for it.
More recently, Duguet & Monjon (2004) propose to examine if innovation is persistent at the
rm level by comparing propensity score and regression methods. They use several innovation sur-
veys on French rmsinnovative activity for the period 1986-1996. These data sets give information
about the implementation of innovation at the rm level, without any reference to their commer-
cial success or their patenting status. Their results indicate that innovation persistence is strong
(a rm that already innovated in the past has a stronger probability to innovate in the future).
In addition, the origin of the persistence depends on the size of the rm: the learning-by-doing
hypothesis (dynamic increasing returns) seems to play a major role in the small sized rms whereas
its weight decreases with the rmssize. Finally the study shows that the importance of dynamic
18Nelson & Winter (1982) dene the Schumpeterian hypothesis as the fact that "A market structure involving
large rms
with a considerable degree of market power is the price that society must pay for rapid technological adavance".
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increasing returns should decrease with the formalization of R&D activities. The paper suggests
that omitting the dynamic increasing returns leads to underestimating the innovation persistence,
especially in small-sized rms. In this vein, Raymond et al. (2005) analyze the extent to which the
production of innovations is subject to "dynamic economies of scale", or whether "success breeds
success". They study the dynamic of innovative achievement and innovation prots in the Dutch
Community Innovation Survey by estimating a dynamic probit model and nd a strong persistence
of innovation prots among the multi-period innovators. Recently, Peters (2005) uses data from
the Mannheim Innovation Panel (manufacturing and service sectors) over the period 1994-2002
through a dynamic random e¤ects discrete choice model. She nds that innovative behaviors are
"permanent at the rm-level to a very large extent" and that skilled employees and unobservable
individual heterogeneity play an important role in explaining this behavior.
Given this state of the art on persistence in innovation, an interesting addition to the liter-
ature would be to look at the nature of these inventions (technological scope, newness...) from
a quantitative point of view and the di¤erent behaviors that might emerge following the rms
characteristics. In this vein, Lerner (1997) examined whether strategic behavior can be identied
in the decision to introduce new products in a high technology industry: the disk drive sector.
Consistently with models rising doubts about the persistence of monopoly, he found that greater
innovative activity is shown by the rms which follow the leader. This result supports the idea
that a second mover advantage exists in technological races Such an assumption may be tested
in a dynamic approach of innovative activity. Empirical works which study persistence by dis-
tinguishing innovation "qualities" or "scope" are very scarce. Such a dimension seems however
fundamental to take into account, especially in the pharmaceutical industry where the "quality"
i.e. the technological magnitudeof new product is often seen as weak. In Geroski et al. (1997),
an e¤ort was made in this sense by taking into account the simple counting of patents and the
number "major innovations" made at the rm level, i.e. those being technically innovative and
commercially successful. However, this criteria may be questionable to the extent that the com-
mercial success should be carefully interpreted and thus may be related to the brand-name or
even the rms advertising among other (unobservable) parameters. Since this denition involves
a commercial success, the rms considered as innovative are likely to be innovation leaders or com-
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mercial leaders. Our study suggests several patent quality measures, exclusively based on forward
and backward patentscitations. These quality measures only refer to the innovationsimportance
in a technological sense and thus allow to proxy for rms innovation activity in a sharper way
than the simple patent count.
2.2 Distinguishing Innovations Quality
Patent count, as a proxy for the rmsinnovative activity, generally leads observers to assume a
perfect homogeneity of quality between and within patent portfolios. Distinguishing the impor-
tance of inventions would however permit to identify the real sources of technological change in the
industry. Taking into account the dynamic e¤ects in such a question could o¤er valuable insights
on the relationships existing among the persistence in innovating, the nature of the rms R&D
output and the inventorscharacteristics (size, market dominance, R&D intensity, etc).
To describe how cumulative innovations are made, and consequently to understand the innova-
tionstechnological magnitude, we suggest several patent citations-based measures. The main idea
supporting this methodology (widely recognized in the literature)19 is that the simple observation
of rmspatenting activity is an unsatisfactory measure of the real innovative e¤ort. This is in
particular the case when rms patent intensively, regardless of the innovationsquality, following a
defence and/or blocking-entry strategy as shown in Lanjouw (1998) and Lanjouw et al. (1998).20
More generally, rms may also di¤er in terms of competence in innovating (depending on history
and on other factors like the position on the supply chain), some of them being more specialized
in fundamental research than others and consequently generate more technological spillovers. In
the next section we also present some of the strategic use of patents that may explain di¤erences
in quality patenting. Overall, the simple patent count should therefore be interpreted carefully.
Whereas technological breakthroughs are able to impel the technological change, others just deepen
into an already existing knowledge. Thus some innovations may have a greater impact on techno-
logical change than others because they may provoke new technological perspectives. According
19See Scherer, 1967, Pakes & Griliches, 1980 and Griliches, 1990 among others on this point.
20As shown by previous studies, there are important di¤erences in R&D performance across industries and rms,
and the way rms rely on patents to appropriate sales; see Scherer (1967), Griliches (1990), Levin et al. (1987),
Cohen & Levin (1989), Arundel & Kabla (1998).
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to this, the main ndings of the literature dealing with the rms innovative behaviors may be
contrasted, particularly concerning the persistence in innovating over the time. Hence, by distin-
guishing the nature of innovations, this paper shows that persistence di¤ers widely according to
innovation quality, pioneering discoveries following a "one shot" process in the short run (even if
they are presumably generated by the same rms) whereas other innovations are more persistent
from one year to the next.
Up to now, some authors have attempted to estimate the private value of patents through their
renewal patterns or by evaluating the stock-market value generated by patents announcements,
among other techniques. Pakes & Schankerman (1984) and Schankerman & Pakes (1986) have
proposed to proxy quality of patents by building the value of patent rights and their distribution
value for the UK, France and Germany during the post-1950 period using renewal patent data21 .
Guellec & Pottelsbergue (2000) study patentsvalues by evaluating the probability of obtaining a
patent grant at the European Patent O¢ ce in function of the technological value of innovation,
patenting and innovation strategies (collaboration etc.) followed by applicants at the international
scale.
Trajtenberg (1990) is the rst to construct an indicator of the value of innovation by weighting
patent grants with the citations they received. He nds a close association between citation-based
patent indices and independent measures of the social value of innovation in the eld of a particular
innovation. An interesting methodology to build a quality-innovation index has been proposed by
Lanjouw & Schankerman (1999). Using information on individual patents (the number of claims,
the forward and backward citations and the family size) to build composite index of quality,
they nd in particular, that the patent quality index shows signicant power in predicting which
patents will be renewed and which will be litigated. Further, Lanjouw & Schankerman (2004)
show that research productivity is negatively correlated with the patent quality index whereas
it is positively correlated with the stock market valuation of patented innovations. Through an
empirical investigation concerning 100 US manufacturing rms, the authors show that the use of
21They show that the variation in the quantity of patents in di¤erent cohorts tended to be negatively related to
the variation in their mean values. As the authors pointed out, this nding implies that exclusive reliance on patent
counts for measuring secular trends in the value of patented output could be quite misleading.
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this quality adjusted measure of innovation could explain the so-called R&D paradox : the apparent
decline in research productivity in the decade 1980-89.22 As they argue, it is likely that rms face
a trade o¤ between "quality" (i.e. importance or scope) and "quantity" of innovation such as one
should expected a negative relationship between patent counts and the average patentsquality at
the rm level, conditional on R&D. Such a result, as the authors indicate, would generate a di¤erent
relationship between R&D and simple patent counts as compared to R&D and quality-adjusted
patents.
2.3 The Strategic Dimension of Patents
An important aspect of patents may be their potential strategic dimension. Hall & Ziedonis (2001)
examine the "patent paradox" i.e. the fact that rms do not rely to patents to appropriate return of
R&Dmore in the 1980s than before despite an unprecedented surge in patenting, they show that the
"1980s strengthening of U.S. patent rights spawned a patent portfolio raceamong capital-intensive
rms". They consequently underlined the use of patents as a strategic variable to build legal rights
to exclude competition in the semiconductor industry. In the study based on a survey questionnaire
by Cohen et al. (2000), rms seem to rely on a large range of mechanisms to protect the prot
due to innovation. They found patents tend to be the least emphasized whereas secrecy and lead
time seems to be the most used strategies in the majority of the manufacturing industries. In the
specic case of the pharmaceutical industry however, rms may more rely on patents as strategic
variable to preserve their business from competition than in other sectors.23 The main reasons
supporting this opinion stand on the fact that secrecy is an extremely weak instrument of protection
because of the (publicly available) clinical trials required in the development of each drugs and also
because the pharmaceutical rmsoutcomes are closely linked with the life of princepspatents.
As a consequence, to extend market exclusivity on drugs beyond patent expiration, a number
of strategies are implemented to deter entry in order to preserve monopoly power. Among them,
Carlton & Gertner (2002) show that "the combination of dynamics, uncertainty, and market power
22Hence Lanjouw & Schankerman (1999, 2004) consider that if innovation varies widely in value, a part of
heterogeneity is due to innovation at birth. As a result they show how it is possible to foresee the value of an
innovation via the four indicators mentioned above. The composite indicator contains the number of forward and
backward citations, the claims and the family size of each patent and is estimated as one-factor latent variable
model where the conditional mean is a linear combination of the indicators.
23See Scherer et al. (1959), Manseld et al. (1981), Manseld (1986) and Levin et al. (1987).
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leads to one of the most important features of many R&D-intensive industries .an important
form of competition is in R&D to replace the existing technology winner that has static market
power with another based on improved technology". Hence, patenting around existing chemical
entities ("me too drugs", ever-green patenting, etc.) have indeed become an important strategy
followed by pharmaceutical rms.24 The increasing threat of generics, allowed by policies like
the Hatch-Waxman Act (1984), may consequently motive research intensive rms to use patents
as a strategic variable to maintain their revenue. Such strategy imply evergreening that occurs
when a brand-name manufacturer stockpilespatent protection by obtaining separate patents on
multiple attributes of a single product.25 To evergreen their products, Carlton & Gertner (2002)
explain that the originator company will develop a life-cycle management plan composed not
only of patent strategies, but an entire range of practices aimed at limiting or delaying the entry
of a generic product into the market. Some of the evergreening strategies are line extensions and
so-called next-generation drugs.26 Patenting around existing chemical entities seems however to be
more and more sought by pharmaceutical rms as shown by Lichtenberg (1996). Much of sequential
innovation thus results from internally generated research and sequential product innovation which
constitute an important feature of the pharmaceutical industry. Hence 60% of the new drugs
approved in the 1990s were for "new formulations" or "new combinations" of already approved
compounds. According to the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
"industry data indicate that of the $26 billion spent by U.S. rms on pharmaceutical research
in 2000, $5 billion (19 %) was spent on post-launch R&D for new indications, new formulations,
and other improvements to existing products. Sequential product innovation is spurred by and
fosters competitive pressures." These market developments, carefully balanced with protections for
seminal intellectual property, have spurred additional innovation and competition. Hence, brand-
name manufacturers introduce new dosage formulations that provide, a priori, superior therapeutic
properties than the original formulation, and introduce over-the-counter versions of products. In
24See Lichtenberg (2000, 2001).
25These patents can cover everything from aspects of the manufacturing process to tablet color, or even a chemical
produced by the body when the drug is ingested and metabolized by the patient (see European Generic Medecines
Association: www.egagenerics.com).
26Some of the evergreening strategies are also switching from prescription-only to over-the-counter status, exclusive
partnerships with chosen generics manufacturers, direct-to-consumer advertising, defensive pricing strategies or even
more to establish a subsidiary generics unit to compete in the generics market before independent generics companies
are allowed to do so.
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parallel, breakthrough drugs may also face competition within their initial patent life from other
branded drugs of the same therapeutic class.27 Consequently, the research intensive rms tend to
rely heavily on product di¤erentiation to achieve competitive advantage over other branded rivals
what, to a certain extent, can be considered as one strategic use of patent. Further, with the
increasing generic competition allowed by the Hatch-Waxman Act, branded manufacturers tend
to develop improved products to retain sales which can be another strategic use of patent.28
Strategic patenting to enclose sub-markets in order to face competition from other research
intensive rms (i.e. brand name manufacturers) or production intensive rms (i.e. generics pro-
ducers), may inuence the technological change by extending, to some rms, the legal right to
exclude imitators up to a foreclosure possibility on a whole technology. Statistically, the strategic
dimension of patents may bias the observation of rmsinnovative e¤orts based on patents data.
Indeed, it remains di¢ cult to distinguish strategic patenting from creative accumulation since in
both cases patents are granted. Nonetheless the di¤erentiating of patent values in a technological
sense allows to identify true innovations from strategic ones.
3 Data and Methodology
This study pursues several research goals. First, an analysis at the patent level is conducted
in order to make a distinction of Leader and Follower (or pioneer and incremental) patents, on
one hand, and to distinguish patents in term of technological value on the other hand. These
distinctions are made thanks to the number of citations made and/or received per patent. Second,
an exploration of the pharmaceutical rmspersistence to innovate, conditional on the di¤erent
kind of innovations stocks, is presented. Third, the feedback e¤ect the dynamics showing the
persistence of innovation over the time of the di¤erent patent grants is explored through an
innovation function equation.
We use two data sources. Firstly, we extracted patent data from the NBER patent data le, by
Hall et al. (2001) concerning USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce) utility patents
27See the "between patent competition" in Lichtenberg & Philipson (2002).
28A recent example is that one of Mopral, which has recently lost its patent protection, which carried out As-
traZeneca to launch Inexium, an improved version, simultaneously with the entry of its generics.
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granted in the classes 424 and 514 (Drug, Bio-A¤ecting and Body Treating Compositions) over
the period 1973-1999. Secondly, we gathered rmspatent data and match it by using the rms
CUSIP (Committee on Uniform Security Identication Procedure) identier code with individual
economic data from Standard & Poors COMPUSTAT annual industrial les database that covers
the period 1975-1995.29 Data are thus reduced to a sample of 77 pharmaceutical rms patenting at
the USPTO between January 1975 and December 1994. We build rmsquality-adjusted portfolio
of patents as the sum of total patents weighted by their citation index which is also provided by
the NBER.
Micro-Level Data from COMPUSTAT concerns R&D spending, capital stock, number of em-
ployees, net sales, capital expenditures, cash ow, and operating income (constant thousand US$
94). After merging the two data sources and keeping only rms having been granted patents at
least three times consecutively at USPTO, we end up with a rather small sample of 77 pharma-
ceutical rms in a unbalanced panel data covering the period 1975-95. Contrary to other studies,
we consider only rms who patent regularly. By this focus we want to consider innovative behav-
iors among real inventors: in the pharmaceutical industry only few patents become drugs30 and
laboratories must test hundreds of patented molecules before obtaining a result which will has a
chance to be claimed an authorized drug. This relatively reduced sample eliminates the bias that
may exist when considering also rms that rarely patent. True drugs inventors have to test many
new chemical entities (NCE) and consequently have to be granted many patents before obtaining
a new promising compound to commercialize.
The database contains approximately 10,000 patents referred at USPTO. In this study, we focus
on the innovations that concern exclusively NCE and we do not take into account other products.
This choice is motivated by the fact that the NCE represent the most important share of the
R&D e¤ort made by rms and because strategic behaviors are expected on this market segment.
The remaining patenting (excluding drugs) is assumed to represent a noisy measure of the real
29Matching between two sources has been made through an intermediary le the containing CUSIP code (Hall et
al. (2001)) and the corresponding corporate company name and USPTOs assignee code. Since Compustat includes
rms that are traded in the US stock market (manufacturing rms) our nal database concerns mainly American
Pharmaceutical Firms.
30 It is well known that in the pharmaceutical industry very few of patents granted will become commercialized
drugs and the failures during the clinical trials are enormous (see works of Grabowski).
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innovative e¤ort made by rms and a weak share of their revenue. This paper deals therefore
exclusively with pharmaceutical rms who extract their revenues from the commercialization of
drugs because it is assumed to be the core of innovative activity in pharmaceuticals. We build rms
total patents portfolio weighted by their citation intensities, in addition to the explaining variable
of total patents counts. Stocks of R&D, non-weighted and weighted patents are built following
the perpetual inventory method using a 15% depreciation/obsolescence rate as traditionally used
in the literature.31
We address the problem of truncation related to patents and citations by implementing the
methodology proposed by Hall et al. (2001). There is an important lag between patent applications
and patent grants (in average about two years) so we observe only a small fraction of the patents
applied which eventually will be granted as we approach the last year of patent data. Patent
counts should then be corrected using weighting factors according to the estimated application-
grant empirical distribution (ibid).32 Similarly, to deal with the problem of truncated citations,
Hall et al. (2001) propose to estimate the shape of the citation-lag distribution, i.e. the fraction
of lifetime citations (dened as the 30 years after the grant date) that are received in each year
after the patent grant. Accordingly, the total citations for any patent (for which we observe
a portion of its citation life) is estimated by dividing the observed citations by the fraction of
the population distribution that lies in the time interval for which citations are observed. It is
assumed that this distribution is stationary and independent of overall citation intensity. Although
the normalization of citations reduces the striking contracting tendency at the end of the period,
it does not eliminate the problem completely. Because our empirical study focuses on the period
1975-1991, it minimizes such a bias. The main reason of the shortening of our panel to 1975-1991
is however that it limits the problems inherent to the wave of mergers and acquisition (M&A) that
characterized the pharmaceutical industry in the mid-nineties. This restructuring of the sector is
indeed assumed to introduce a bias in the observation of innovative activities at the rm level
since the acquisition of knowledge cannot be taken into account.
31See Griliches (1989), Hall & Mairesse (1995).
32We use patent data from 1975, patent stocks are built for those rms patenting before this year. Therefore we
do not need to adjust the patent counts for application lags but we will have to adjuste the patent counts for the
last periods. Patent counts beyond 1993 (since only about half the patents applied for in 1994 are observed due to
grand lags).
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3.1 Distinguishing Innovations from Patents and Citations
Originality Index
In order to distinguish patents in terms of technological specicity, we use a citation-based measure
suggested in Henderson, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg (1998) and Hall et al. (2002). Innovation Originality
captures the extent to which a patent cites a wide range of technological classes or if its technological
basis is rather concentrated on few technological areas. The measure of Originality is a Herndahl
concentration index such as:
Originality = 1 
NiX
k=1

Ncitedi;k
Ncitedi
2
(1)
where k is the index of patent classes and Ni is the number of di¤erent classes to which the cited
patents belong.
Hence if a new patent cites patents that belong to a narrow set of technologies (UPSTO patent
classes), the originality score will be low, whereas if it cites patents in a wide range of elds
would render a high score (notice that 0  Originality  1 and that higher values represent
less concentration and hence more Originality). It thus measures how the innovators R&D is
diversied or specialized. As shown by Cockburn & Henderson (1998) and Henderson & Cockburn
(1996), pharmaceutical rms which are more technologically diversied have been found to enjoy
a stronger R&D productivity thanks to economies of scope.
3.1.1 Citations Adjusted Patents
As a measure of innovationstechnological "quality" or signicance, we weight the rmsyearly
patent count by the number of forward citations it generates the following years.33 Such a measure
exhibits the impact a patent portfolio, and consequently a rm in a given year, will exerts on the
technological dynamics. Indeed, the number of citations received show the level of inuence that
an innovation exerts on further innovations and consequently its technological importance. The
33 It is important to note that the complete listing of backward citations is made by the patent examiners and not
only by the patentor itself: there is consequently no potential bias due to the rmsclaims.
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variable Citations Adjusted Patent (CA) shows the (yearly average)34 number of citations received
per the patents of the rm which are granted this year. It represents one of our proxy for the rms
innovative activity. Such a variable increases with the number of forward citations and decreases
with the number of patents granted this year by the rms. As a consequence, the larger the number
of citations a patent portfolio has received, the greater its "quality" or "inuence". However such
a measure take into account only one dimension of innovation, the technological impact, and does
not consider its cumulative aspect. To track the pioneering behavior this measure is consequently
not completely satisfactory insofar as it does not refer to the citations made (which can proxy
for the degree of novelty) but only on the citations received (which proxy for the technological
importance).
Leader and Follower Patents
We consider a patent represents a pioneering discovery if it satises two criteria: rst the inno-
vation must be non cumulative, second it must be technologically inuent. As a consequence a
pioneering innovation must be both new and inuent. Hence we separate patents in two categories
which denote both their technological novelty and their importance. Compared with the simple
patent weighting by citations received, this patent distinction considers both forward and backward
citations. A patent is Leader if its forward citations exceeds the yearly industry median35 whereas
its backward citations remains inferior to the yearly industry median (considering the citations
yearly observed in the patent classes 424 and 514).36 As a consequence a Leader patent is dened
relatively to the other patents granted the same year (see Figure 3 in annex).
Such patents exhibit, in comparison to the median, of a greater inuence on the technological
path design and of a lower dependence on existing technologies. Leader patents are consequently
those which, technologically, lead the technological change, thanks to a relatively strong creativity
34Because our data are yearly aggregated at the rms level, the weighted patent count is represented by the ratio
of yearly citations received by the number of patents granted.
35 It would be possible to use the mean instead of the median since there is no sensible di¤erences between the
two type of calculations. Results do not change according to the type of calculation used.
36Forward and backward citations included in this mark cover the period 1963-2000; as a consequence we consider
all citations received up to 2000 whatever the granting date. As our study only cover the period 1975-91, patents
granted in 1991 can receive citation up to year 2000. In addition, as mentioned previously, recall patent citations
used in all the study have been normalized following the methodology proposed by Hall et al. (2001).
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which is widely di¤used in the industry. Follower patents as the remaining patents of the sample so
that they represent all patents which are not considered as pioneers (Leader+Follower = Total of
patents). Follower patents are those which have received at most as many citations as the yearly
industry median and which have made at least as many citations as the yearly industry median
(see extension for the results of estimations on Follower patenting which are not presented here).
To our knowledge, there is no empirical works have di¤erentiated the inventions like this. Duguet
(2002), for example, distinguishes incremental and radical innovations on the basis of the rms
claims in a innovation survey which do not constitute an homogeneous technological viewpoint.
For the full period (before having shortened the panel to 1975-91) we have the following trends
in the granting of Leader and Follower patents:
Figure 1
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The number of Follower patents apparently increases over the time whereas the number of
Leader patents granted shows a slower and contracting movement along the period. The propensity
to grant pioneering discoveries decreases over the time, especially since the mid eighties (the Hatch
Waxman Act was enacted in 1984). The ratio of these two indicators (see appendix) conrms
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a relative decline in the Leader patenting compared to the Follower patenting. In fact, fewer
and fewer patents propose radical technological change which assumes improvement strategies
characterize the period considered probably as a response to the new competition impulsed by
biotech rms. It could imply a greater use of internal knowledge if rms seek to stand on their
previous inventions to introduce new products. Yet rms can also improve technologies that are
not their own discoveries.
Internalized Spillovers
When a patent stands on the patented rms previous innovations, it indicates a process of inter-
nalized spillover that can be evaluated through the number of self-citations that are made (the
extent to which a patent cites the previous patents granted by the rm).37 According to Hall &
al. (2001) an interesting issue is that "presumably citations to patents that belong to the same
assignee represent transfers of knowledge that are mostly internalized, whereas citations to patents
of othersare closer to the pure notion of (di¤used) spillovers." In other words, few citations to
rival rms, or others entities, would mean that the rm does not rely on external spillovers as
much as it relies on internal knowledge. The gure in the appendix shows that the use of self
citations increases dramatically over the period. Hence the rms of our sample apparently rely
more and more on their previous inventions to innovate. Such a trend highlights the increasing
di¢ culties to innovate radically over the time i.e. to create new knowledge. Empirically these
observations coincide with the introduction of the Hatch-Waxman Act (enacted in 1984)38 which
provides incentives to support the development of generic versions of o¤-patent drugs and permit
patent owners to recover time lost during FDA approval. As shown by the gures 1 and 2, it
is possible to hypothesize that the pharmaceutical rms seek to retain their sales through prod-
uct development strategies in order to face the pressure exerted by generics. More generally our
37The percentage of self-citations is computed as in Hall et al. (2001): for each patent that has an assignee code
we count the number of citations that it made to (previous) patents that have the same assignee code, and we divide
the count by the total number of citations that it made.
38Since the laws passage, the generic industrys share of the prescription drug market has jumped from less than
20 % to almost 50 % today. The economic realities of non-innovator commodity production allow generics to enter
the market at a signicant discount, and for prices to decrease with increased generic entry. Before the 1984 law, it
took 3-5 years for a generic copy to enter the market after the expiration of an innovators patent. Today, generic
copies often come to market as soon as the patent on an innovator product expires. Prior to the Hatch-Waxman
Act, only 35 percent of top-selling innovator medicines had generic competition after their patents expired. Today,
almost all innovator medicines face such competition (see PhrMA (2002)).
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data conrm previous empirical ndings relating a decrease of inventiveness in pharmaceuticals:
fewer and fewer pioneering inventions are discovered leading to an erosion of the number of new
(technological) promising compounds invented.
In the pharmaceutical industry our proxies of innovation based on citations criteria (Leader,
Follower, Citations Adjusted patenting) allow us to measure the propensity to improve already
existing solution rather than to create technological breakthroughs. They are thus means to put
into evidence the kind of strategy of research led by the current pharmaceutical rms and how the
past innovative activity of these rms may inuence their present innovative behaviors. Several
patent stocks are therefore built for further employment in the knowledge production functions for
each rm.
3.2 An Innovation Equation
Propensity to Innovate: Distinguishing the Nature of Innovations
A key focus of interest in this paper is the estimation of an innovation equation Iit where I denotes
either the Non Adjusted patent count, the Citations Adjusted patent count or the Leader patent
count which are described above. Following Hausman et al. (1984) and Blundell et al. (1999), for
a latent variable of innovation Iit; we consider the knowledge production function:39
Iit = f(xit; i) (2)
where xit is a vector of rm i characteristics (e.g. past R&D investments) and unobservable
invariant rm-specic factors are represented by the term i. It represents permanent unobservable
di¤erences across rms a¤ecting the production of innovation rms (appropriability conditions,
marketing strategy or nancial characteristics). This relationship is derived as the outcome of
a rms optimal search rule for innovation (Blundell et al. (1995), Reinganum, 1989) where the
search process is assumed to generate innovations in future periods. Iit represents the several
patent-based proxies for innovations made by the rm i at time t described previously. Because
39See also Hausman et al. (1984); Winkelmann & Wimmermann (1992); Crepon & Duguet, (1997); Blundell et
al. (2000), among others.
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the number of patents is a non-negative integer, we adopt count data regressions as described
by Hausman et al. (1984) and Blundell et al. (1999). We model the conditional mean as a
multiplicative or log link function of explanatory factors as:
Iit = exp(x
0
it + i) + "it (3)
= itvi + "it; for i = 1; :::; N and t = 1; :::; T
where it = exp
(xit); vi = exp(i) and " is a disturbance term with expected value 0. xit is a vector
of observed explanatory variables, and  is the corresponding vector of parameters to be estimated
including lagged values of rmsmarket share, R&D expenditures and stock of knowledge, etc.
The full empirical model is dened as:
Iit = exp(1 log(Sales)it 1 + 2 log(R&D)it 1 + 3MSit 1
+4CSit 1 + 5Originalityit 1 + 6Selfit 1 + 7GIit 1 + i) + "it (4)
for i = 1; :::; 77 and t = 1; :::; T ; where Iit= fNAit; CAit; Litg
In this specication, rms innovation propensity is conditional on previous market power,
measured by the lagged value of total sales log(Sales)it 1; R&D e¤ort log(R&D)it 1; market-share
MSit 1, Citations Share CSit 1; Originality index Originalityit 1 (calculated according to the
fromula (1)) and internal spillover (Self-Citation propensity) Selfit 1. Considering the dynamics
of innovation, we then introduce the lagged knowledge stock variables GNA; CA; L; t 1 (where
subscripts NA refer to Non Adjusted patent stock GNA; t 1; CA to Citations Adjusted patent
stock GCA; t 1; and L to Leader patents stock GL; t 1) into the knowledge production function
(see Blundell et al. 1999 for a comparable specication). All stocks are calculated following the
perpetual inventory methods proposed by Hall et al. (2005).
The expected e¤ects of market share and total sales on innovation propensity are ambiguous.
Strategic considerations imply that the marginal benet of an innovation (an additional increment
to the rms innovation stock, Gi;t) may be more valuable to a market leader than to a follower
as shown through the "e¢ ciency e¤ect" described in Gilbert & Newbery (1982). In contrast,
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dominant rms may be more reluctant to innovate as they nd it more protable to exploit
existing innovations.40 This case thus illustrates the Reiganums "cannibalization" model (1989)
or "displacement e¤ect". The self citations show how the rm relies on the previous inventions
it made to generate NCE. On the one hand, it is expected that it inuences positively on the
Non Adjusted patenting because of the product development strategies described previously, and
negatively for the Leader patenting if we hypothesis that self citations exhibit the cumulative
nature of innovation within rms. On the other hand, the internal spillover e¤ects may also help
to generate high quality innovations because they represent a technological advantage as the rm
exploits its knowledge to invent. If we hypothesis that pioneering discoveries follow a multi stage
process of invention requiring several knowledge, self citations may have a positive inuence. As a
result of these two possible impacts, the potential e¤ect of internalized spillover (i.e. self citations)
on the rmsinnovation propensity and persistence in innovating is undetermined.
Individual knowledge stock variables are obtained by accumulating past patents granted: Gi;t =
Ii;t+(1+ Gi;t 1). The stock of knowledge increases continuously by the addition of new patents,
but it also continuously decreases at the constant depreciation/obsolescence, rate  (15%).41
Knowledge-stocks should exert a positive e¤ect on the propensity of the rm to innovate as there
are dynamic returns in the production of innovation. Cumulated technological experience facili-
tates in some way current R&D productivity: R&D economies of scale (see Teece, 1980; Cohen &
Levin, 1989; Chandler, 1990), learning-by-doing, and learning-by-learning e¤ects (see Rosenberg,
1987 and Cohen & Klepper, 1996). Concerning dynamics of innovation it is expected to nd higher
persistence in low quality patenting for rms that use patent as a strategic variable to preserve
market power, whereas highest quality (i.e. Leader) patenting should be less persistent over the
time since it requires presumablylarge R&D spending and may need developments to be com-
mercialized. Concerning the Citations Adjusted patenting the expected e¤ect of lagged patenting
is more ambiguous because it capture two dimensions: that one of the number of patent granted
( ) and that one of the number of citations received (+). We also include two additional lagged
40They may also rely on alternative strategies to keep market power as presented earlier (technological foreclu-
sion...).
41 Initial values of Gi;t correspond to the pre-sample stock of patents for rms patenting before 1975, otherwhise
patentstocks for rms appearing after 1975 are calculated according to the perpetual inventory method following
Griliches (1989) or Hall & Mairesse (1995).
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terms referring to the rms innovation degree of Originality and the rmscitations (received)
share. They constitute the yearly mean value of rmspatent portfolio. The rmscitation share
represents the share the rm own in the industry total forward citations (i.e. the sum of citations
received) by patents granted in classes 424 and 514. It thus measures the degree of technologi-
cal leadership. If technology-leaders have stronger incentives to remain in the innovation race, it
should enter positively for the rmsinnovation propensity as mentioned in Segestrom &Woniereck
(1999) then Hörner (2001). Nonetheless, its impact must di¤er a priori according to the quality
level of patenting (see Henderson, 1993).42
Estimation Method for a Linear Feedback Model (LFM)
An important feature of our study is the estimation of a dynamic model (i.e. including linear
feedback) to assess the persistence with which rms innovate. Given the panel dynamic speci-
cation of the model, several practical problems have to be handled: rst, the autocorrelation
problems imposed by the lagged variables. These lagged variables are by nature dependent on
past disturbances, which makes them predetermined variables in the equation. Second, we have to
deal with the time series cross-section nature of data and account for the presence and features of
the unobserved components of residuals (i.e. non-observed heterogeneity). Third, the appropriate
lag length of the auto regressive-distributed lag model have to be determined.
A series of strong assumptions must be respected in order to apply traditional OLS or panel
data estimators. Including the lagged dependent variable as one of the regressors makes pooled
OLS as well as classic error component estimators obsolete. Poisson or Negative Binomial models,
because they assume that the regressors are strictly exogenous, cannot be used as mentioned by
Montalvo (1997) and Blundell et al. (2000). The count panel data literature has largely focused on
estimating models for patenting and the returns to R&D investments. A seminal paper of Hausman
et al. (1984) initiated a growing literature estimating patent and innovation production functions
using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator allowing for correlated rm specic
42Likewise, a weak citation-share indicates that other rms or competitors own a larger part of the new technology.
Hence competitive spillovers may have a negative rivalry e¤ect on a rms likelihood to apply for a patent : the
more competitors invet in R&D, the less a rm is likely to invent a new technology (see Loury (1979), Lee and
Wilde (1982)).
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e¤ects and weakly exogenous inputs.43 It involves estimation of a dependent variable as a function
of its lagged value and other endogenous, pre-determined and exogenous variables in the presence
of unobserved heterogeneity. The model is estimated in two stages using the residual of the rst
stage to compute an optimal weighting matrix, which is subsequently used in the second stage.
As we analyze the e¤ects of lagged innovation ows on the current propensity to innovate, we
employ the nonlinear GMM method discussed and implemented by Windmeijer (2002) ExpEnd
and used in similar conditions by Kim & Marschke (2005) then Salomon & Shaver (2005).44
The conditional mean in the LFM is dened as:
E(Iit j Iit 1; xit; vi) = Iit 1 + exp(x0it)vi (5)
 Iit 1 + itvi
We implement the Arellano and Bond test for rst and second order serial autocorrelation of
residuals (AR(1); AR(2)) in the di¤erenced error terms to test the validity of the set of instruments
(reported at the bottom of each table). If it is not serially correlated, the di¤erence residuals should
be characterized by negative rst-order serial correlation and the absence of second-order serial
correlation (which is the case for all our equations). Then, the Hansen test (two stepsSYS-
GMM) of over-identifying restrictions is applied: it tests for correlation between the instruments
that are excluded from the second stage model and the residuals. It conducts a test for the null
hypothesis that the remaining theoretical orthogonality restrictions are equal to zero (see Hansen,
1982 and Sargan, 1985). Failure to reject the null hypothesis indicates that the instruments are
valid, and then supports the validity of the model specication (which is the case for all our
equations).
43See the development of the quasi-di¤erencing approach of Chamberlain (1992) and Wooldridge (1991, 1997) by
Montalvo (1997), Cinera (1997), Crépon and Duguet (1997), Blundell et al. (1999) and Blundell et al. (2002).
44The di¤erent parameterization between the multiplicative feedback model (MFM) and the liner feedback model
(LFM) (Blundell et al. (1999), Cincera (1998)) implies that, in comparison to the LFM, the coe¢ cients E(Iit)
in the MFM measures the short run impact of a change in Xit. As explained by Blundell et al (1999), in the
MFM the nonlinear dynamic makes it di¢ ccult to judge the stability properties of the model and the potentially
important feedback parameter is sensititive to large innovation counts. In a similar study, Blundell et al. (1999)
implement both specications and both models are found to yield similar estimates for the main parameters of
interest. Although a non-nested comparison has suggested a preference for the LFM speciciation.
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The full dynamic model is dened as:
Iit = exp(1Iit 1+2Iit 2 + 3Iit 3 + 4Iit 4
+5 log(Sales)it 1 + 6 log(R&D)it 1 + 7MSit 1 (6)
+8CSit 1 + 9Originalityit 1 + 10Selfit 1 + i) + "it
for i = 1; :::; 77 and t = 1; :::; T ; where Iit= fNAit; CAit; Litg
where Iit n denote the feedbacks (I = NA;CA;L and n = 1:::4) successively included in the
equation.
4 Empirical Results
Table 1 presents summary statistics describing the data. Averaging across all rms and years, our
sample spent on average $283 in R&D and has average sales of $2,786 (thousand $US 1994) whereas
the average market share (the share of the rm in the whole sectors sales reported by Compustat)
is 0.5% with a rather large standard error (0.9). When looking at the innovations made by rms,
expected values are found since the yearly Non Adjusted patenting is widely stronger than the
Leader patenting (on average for 10 patents applied only one is a Leader). Our rms grant in
average 25 patents over the period with (approximately) 3 Leader and 22 Follower patents (recall
we take only account for patents granted in classes 424 & 514). On average our rms receive 6
citations per patent and the ratio of total citations received by each patent stock is almost 23
(versus a maximum of 135). Patent stocks appear very heterogeneous: 25.4 in average but 536.5
in max (recall patent stocks are continuously depreciated over the time and consequently values
are not integer). This rst exploration of the data thus rst indicates that they are relatively few
innovations made in volume compared with Non Adjusted patenting.
- Table 1 about here -
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4.1 Propensity in Innovating
Table 2 displays the estimations of equation (4) on the innovation equation using the GMM-
Wooldridge estimator on our di¤erent proxies for rmsinnovative activity. Columns 1-2 display
results of Non Adjusted patents, whereas columns 3-4 concern estimations of Citations Adjusted
patents and columns 5-6 concern estimations of Leader patents.
- Table 2 about here -
Results indicate that the role played by internal spillover, the Self-Citations variable, is signif-
icant to explain the Citations Adjusted and especially the Non Adjusted patenting. The e¤ect is
the largest for the simple patent count and is not signicant for the Leader patenting (column 1, 3
and 5) what suggests rms which often rely on their previous inventions to innovate do not grant
the most cited patents. Product developments leading to low quality innovations (in a technolog-
ical sense), technological improvements would tend to be less cited than others. Considering the
specications 3-4, the weak stability of this variable shows that it captures the dynamic process
of innovation: the coe¢ cient strongly decreases when introducing the patent stock (columns 1-2 )
and becomes negative when introducing the Citations Adjusted patent stock (columns 3-4).
Concerning the role played by market power, interesting results are found: the rmsmarket
share is negatively correlated with the Citations Adjusted patenting and positively with the Non
Adjusted patenting while it is not signicant to explain the Leader patenting. The amount of sales
of the previous period conrms that the rmslevel of commercial activity (or size) is negatively
correlated with the quality of inventions: the smallest rms seem indeed to be the most cited
and consequently those having the largest technological inuence. In addition the coe¢ cient of
the amount of sales is signicant and negative to explain the Leader patenting conrming that
inuent technologies comes essentially from rms with a low commercial activity (presumably a
low nancial leadership). Consequently, if the rmsmarket power is not signicant to explain the
pioneering behavior, the amount of sales, as proxying for the rms size and/or level of commercial
activity, seems to matter. These results then conrm the Reiganums cannibalization model nding:
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dominant rms have few incentive to provoke the technological change by fear of conicts in their
product portfolio and overlaps in their source of revenue it may cause. More generally, another
explanation sheds light on some possible research intertia: largest rms have di¢ culties to take
some distance with their own knowledge base and consequently to generate radical technological
changes.
An interesting nding is the role played by the various patent stocks in the propensities to
innovate.45 Stocks are always positive and signicant which suggests, as expected, that the rms
knowledge base plays positively in the propensity to innovate. Nevertheless, the patent stocks
coe¢ cients are rather small but appears relatively strong for the Leader patent stock. The Leader
patent stocks are thus strongly correlated with the current Leader patenting suggesting only some
rms are responsible for a large share of the technological breakthroughs.
The R&D expenses are always signicant and positive even if substantial di¤erences across coef-
cients suggest a greater importance for the Leader patenting, then for the Citations Adjusted ones
and least for the Non Adjusted patenting. As expected, the level of R&D expenses is therefore cor-
related with the importance of inventions: the higher the R&D expenses, the larger the probability
to grant Leader patents. It is interesting to note that the simple patent count is slightly connected
with the past R&D expenses, compared to the other patenting. It thus reinforces the hypothesis
according to which (large) rms may have a strategic use of patents since they seems weakly linked
to a real innovative e¤ort as measured by the R&D activity. Considering the diversication of the
R&D, the Originality score is always positive and a particularly large e¤ect is found for the Leader
patenting. Recall that innovationsOriginality constitutes our measure of rmsR&D diversi-
cation.46 Hence, conrming previous studies, pharmaceutical rms which are more diversied in
their knowledge base (larger scope of R&D) are found to enjoy a stronger R&D productivity (due
to R&D economies of scope). Surprisingly this R&D diversication is found to have the largest
impact on Leader patents and the lowest on Citations Adjusted patents. The scope of R&D there-
fore stimulates the newness and importance of research output even if the e¤ect is relatively low
when considering only the importance of innovations disregarding newness (Citations Adjusted
45Stocks are calculated according to the perpetual inventory method using a yearly 15% depreciation rate.
46See Cockburn & Henderson (1998), Henderson et al. (1998) and Henderson & Cockburn (1996).
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patents). The diversication of R&D therefore appears to be an important factor contributing
to pioneering discoveries. It suggests that spillover occurring between technological classes sup-
port the rmsinventiveness. To a certain extent, such an importance of Originality for Leader
patenting highlights the potential importance of links (i.e. strategic interactions) between the
di¤erent dimension for the pharmaceutical research (presumably biotechnologies/pharmaceutical
and chemical/pharmaceutical).
Finally these estimations suggest at rst sight that small rms are more inuent whereas large
rms appear to be mainly technological developers through a strong (Non Adjusted) patenting
activity. While the Non Adjusted and Citations Adjusted patent stocks have a signicant but
rather small impact on the current propensity to innovate, the Leader patent stock is relatively
important. This highlights the role played by small research intensive rms for the technological
path design in pharmaceuticals.
4.2 Dynamic of Innovation
Tables 3, 4 and 5 display the estimations of equation (6) on the rmspersistence in innovating
over the time (the dynamic model). Table 3 displays results of Non Adjusted, whereas Table 4
concerns estimations of Citations Adjusted and Table 5 shows estimations of Leader patenting.
We analyze the feedback of past innovations up to four years before the current propensity to
innovate as a means to characterize the rmspersistence in innovation. For each equation we
assess the feedbacks e¤ect of rmsinnovating activity in t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4 on their current
innovation ows. We rstly present results on Non Adjusted then on Citations Adjusted and
Leader patenting. The equations assessing the persistence with which rms innovate conrm
previous ndings: innovations quality is negatively correlated with the rms level of activity
(rms dominance). In addition, the persistence in innovating is inversely proportional to the
quality of patenting such that highest quality innovations are the least persistent, at least in the
short run.
The role of R&D expenditures is always signicant and positive regarding the di¤erent patent-
ing propensities but its score is increasingly large according to the technological importance of
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innovations. Hence, as expected, the technological inuence (the propensity to be cited) and the
innovation novelty are linked with the rmse¤ort in R&D. Cohen & Kleppers (1996) suggest that
innovations are not directly linked between them and only the continuity in the R&D expenses
ensures the persistence in innovating. The simultaneous inclusion of both the R&D expenses and
past innovations variables in our equations thus allows us to test this assumption. Our results
nally reject the Cohen & Kleppersprediction since the R&D score is always signicant as well
as the feedbacks on patenting. Consequently the persistence in innovating does not reect only a
continuous ow of R&D expenses insofar as the past innovating activities remain signicative de-
spite the signicance of the R&D expenses. At the rm level, innovations are consequently related
between them conrming Duguet & Monjon (2002)s ndings who reject the Cohen & Klepper
(1996)s hypothesis. We now detail the di¤erent dynamics of innovation according to our three
dependant variables proxying for rmsinnovation activity: Non Adjusted, Citations Adjusted and
Leader patent counts.
Persistence of Patenting (Non Adjusted patents)
At the simple patent count level, the feedbacks are almost always signicant at the 1% level. There
is however no evidence of a decreasing persistence following the importance of lags introduced in the
equation. When comparing columns 1 and 4, it even seems that the coe¢ cients tend to increase.
That means the Non Adjusted patenting does not erode itself over the time and consequently that
rms are strongly persistent in using patents. More generally such result exhibit the (increasing)
importance of patents in pharmaceuticals.
Considering the research e¤orts, the coe¢ cients of R&D expenditures is always positive and
decreases a little as the feedbacks increases. It suggests that the more persistent patenting over the
time apparently do not require the largest expenses in R&D. If we hypothesize that some strategic
use of patents are at work, the interpretation of the R&Ds decreasing coe¢ cient is straightforward:
the building of barriers to entry, product development and other foreclosing strategies represent a
weak innovative behavior which need few expenditures in R&D, once controlling for rms e¤ects.
Such a result suggests the Non Adjusted patenting as a whole captures some behaviors that are
not related to a pure innovative activity as the strategic patenting and/or innovations.
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Considering the rmsmarket shares, the coe¢ cient tends to increase with the importance of
feedbacks. It means most persistent rms in Non Adjusted patenting are also those who benet
from the largest market power. Because the amount of salescoe¢ cient follows the same trend, one
may therefore deduct this e¤ect is proper to the rmssize: largest rms are the most persistent
in granting Non Adjusted patents.
- Table 3 about here -
The dynamic analysis of the Non Adjusted patenting seems to support the assumption accord-
ing to which largest rms (those having the largest level of commercial activity and market share)
are those who have the greatest use of patents but without having the research e¤ort that would
however be necessary to really innovate in the same proportion. Table 3 thus justies our method-
ology the use of di¤erent proxies for rms innovationsby showing that continuous patent ows
do not reect necessarily persistence in innovation but persistence in patenting.
Persistence of Innovating (Citations Adjusted patents)
Similarly with Duguet & Monjon (2004), in our the Citations Adjusted equations, the coe¢ cient
of lagged innovations decreases with the importance of the lag introduced in the equation. It
suggests some kind of knowledge depreciation takes place and consequently that strong entry
barrier to innovation exist. In contrast to their ndings, our coe¢ cient however remains almost
always signicant at the 1% level, regardless of the number of lags (up to four years). Hence the
pharmaceutical industry seems to be characterized by a learning-by-doing which is depreciating
as time goes on. This result have to be put in relation with the fact that the coe¢ cient of the
rst lag of the Citations Adjusted patent is particularly strong in contrast with the Non Adjusted
patent count but also relatively to additional lags. After two years of lags, the coe¢ cients and
their signicance seems however less smooth what suggests the persistence in granting Citations
Adjusted patents is lower after two years.
Compared with table 3, the coe¢ cient of R&D is stronger and increases signicantly with the
importance of lags. In addition to the rejection of the Cohen and Kepllers hypothesis, we deduct
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that persistence in Citations Adjusted patenting reects indeed a real innovative behavior since
rms tend to increase their R&D expenses when the Citations Adjusted patenting goes on. This
conrms previous ndings in the literature (presented earlier): the Citations Adjusted patenting is
a better proxy for innovation than the whole patenting since it results from higher R&D e¤orts.
Considering sales and market shares, coe¢ cients are always negative what conrm that largest
rms have the lowest technological inuence. As the importance of the coe¢ cient of market share
increases with the importance of lags, table 4 suggests the more persistent rms in Citations
Adjusted patenting are also the smallest: market domination is inversely proportional with the
technological inuence.
- Table 4 about here -
Results which are presented in table 4 conrm the importance of smallest rms in the pharma-
ceuticalstechnological dynamics. They seem to be a major source of technological change to the
extent that pharmaceutical patents as a whole widely cite their inventions. These inventions tend
therefore to have a large impact at the industrial level.
Persistence of Pioneering Behaviors (Leader patents)
The estimations on the dynamics of Leader patenting (those patents which are more cited and
which cite less than the yearly industrial medians) show that the feedbacks have always a negative
inuence on the current propensity to grant other Leader patents but with increasingly small
coe¢ cients according to the importance of lags. The rms pioneering behavior thus tends to
reduce further innovative ambitions even if this e¤ect decreases as the time goes on. Hence rms
having already granted Leader patents have a strong probability, in the short run, to exhibit a
zero count of it in the following years (see Salomon & Shaver, 2005 for similar interpretations in
another context). This is straightforward to interpret: some rms canalize their innovative e¤ort
(R&D expenditures for instance) for some occasional technological breakthroughs which then limit
their future inventive capacities in the short run.
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Consequently the pioneering behaviors seem to be not bearable by the rms for each period. It
is possible that the time needed to create a technological breakthrough does not allow persistence
from one year to another. Another explanation is supported by the coe¢ cients of the R&D
expenditures that show the Leader patenting needs exceptional expenses in research that are
probably not bearable continuously. The coe¢ cients of R&D are indeed the strongest compared
with other proxies for innovation: the quality ranking of innovation thus follow that one of the
R&D expenses.
- Table 5 about here -
Table 5 shows larger investments in R&D are needed to grant Leader patents compared to
other innovations. The main nding concerns the deterring e¤ect of past pioneering behaviors
on the current Leader patenting. When comparing this result with column 9 of table 2 we can
however deduce that pioneering rms belong to a quite stable group since the Leader patent stock
is signicantly positive to explain the Leader patenting.
4.3 Overall Results
In general one may consider that persistence in innovative activities shed light on the presence of
barriers to entry since a technological dynamics exists at the rm level. This interpretation of the
persistence in innovative activities is consistent with the coe¢ cients on the Self Citations in table
2 which show that smaller innovations often cites the rmsprevious inventions. Hence in some
cases the persistence is strong but decreasing (Citations Adjusted patent), in some other cases the
persistence is weaker but increasing (Non Adjusted patents) whereas it can be negative revealing
a dynamic deterring e¤ect of some innovations (Leader patents) which decreases with the number
of lags.
The impact of size and market power found in table 3 are conrmed in the dynamic equations.
Whereas the amount of sales (the rms level of commercial activity) increases the probability to
grant patents, with increasingly important coe¢ cients according to the number of lags, it reduces
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the probability to inuence the technological change: the coe¢ cients are always negative concerning
the quality patents (Citations Adjusted and Leader). The role played by the market dominance is
the same, even if in both cases the coe¢ cients are stronger.
As a result, whereas the market power increases the probability to be persistent in granting
patents, it decreases the propensity to provide highly inuent patents and this e¤ect increases with
the importance of feedbacks. This is a key result of the paper insofar as it sheds light on the e¤ect
of market dominance on innovation in pharmaceuticals. Dominant rms are indeed persistent
only for low quality innovations, suggesting a strategic use of patents to maintain revenues that
are presumably threatened by generic entry. Dominant rms do not have a strong technological
inuence and the smaller rms are apparently the real sources of technological change.47
An interpretation of these results indicates larger pharmaceutical rms innovate in a closed
loop (see Fudendberg & Tirole, 1984) that leads them to have a strategic management of their
knowledge and innovative capacities. Innovations are thus linked between them at the rm level
and large rms seem experience research inertia. Whereas the persistence of low quality innovations
is found to be strong, the pioneering patenting deters further Leader inventions even if, considering
stocks, these breakthroughs seem to be the fruit of the same group of innovators. The strategic
use of patent (or more generally the strategic innovations) seems therefore play a signicant role
in pharmaceuticals, especially for rms having the largest commercial activity.
4.4 Extensions
To rene the analysis on the Non Adjusted patent count several additional regressions of equations
(4) and (6) have been implemented by excluding Leader patents from the rmsNon Adjusted
patents count.48 In these regressions the dependant variable is thus the Follower patents ow
as being all the patents granted excepting the Leader ones. These regressions primarily aimed
at checking if the rms importance was really correlated with the lowest quality patents. For
comparison we thus carried out estimations on the Follower patents as being a measurement even
47Similar conclusion where found with linear IV-GMM in an earlier version of this paper.
48The use of the level of employment instead of the level of sales to take into account the rmssize has also been
tested and give similar results; we kept however the level of sales because it also take into account the commercial
activity. The tables of all these regressions are available uppon request.
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more antagonistic with the Citations Adjusted patent count. The results reinforce the preceding
conclusions: persistence is appreciably stronger (the coe¢ cient is 0.32 with feedbacks of four years
versus 0.26 for the whole patent count), the coe¢ cients of total sales are also higher and especially
that one of the market share. Parallel to that the coe¢ cients of R&D expenses are naturally less
important (but still signicant) whereas the index of Originality is more important what justies
the evoked assumption according to which the Originality index is sensitive to the volume of
backward citations. The exclusion of Leader patents from the Non Adjusted patent count then
does not reject the assumption according to which patent may have a strategic dimension for
largest rms and that its broadest use does not reect necessarily a richest innovative activity.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the American pharmaceutical rms persistence in innovating just before
the wave of mergers and acquisitions that have followed the biotech revolution (known as the
"third wave"). We evaluate the impact of past innovative activity on rmsinnovation propensities
using a non-linear GMM estimator for exponential models that allows for predetermined regressors
and linear feedbacks. Hence, an empirical investigation on Non Adjusted, Citations Adjusted and
"Leader" patents has been presented both on innovation propensities and persistence in innovation.
We nd that innovative activity at the rm level depends strongly on the size of past innovations.
The results also shed light on the importance of small rms in the dynamics of innovation in
pharmaceuticals, and suggest that large rms persist in using patents strategically in order to
preserve their revenues by evergreen their commercialized products. Pharmaceutical innovation
in general, and pioneer innovation in particular, depends thus largely on past quality innovation
made by rms, and this e¤ect may likely deter further Leader innovations rather than strengthen
incentives to invest on pioneering invention. In addition, the strategic use of patents seems to be
an important feature of the pharmaceutical industry and well announce the wave of concentration
that follows our period of analysis which will be explored in further works.
The estimates suggest that in the pharmaceutical industry the "displacement e¤ect" is likely to
dominate the potential "e¢ ciency e¤ect" attributed to market dominant rms when we relax the
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patent homogeneity assumption. Further, (large) pharmaceutical rms may nd it more protable
over time to make incremental innovation product developments and strategic innovationsrather
than high quality innovations. When considering how persistently pharmaceutical rms innovate,
the functioning of innovation seems to support the hypothesis that the pioneering behavior, at the
rm level, is not persistent whereas the Citations Adjusted patenting is eroding on the short run
and the simple patent count appears to be more stable over the time. A key result of the paper
is thus that technological breakthroughs need large investments in R&D that limit the ability of
rms to be persistent sources of radical technological change (from one year to another). However,
the Leader patenting seems to come often from the same rms as evidenced by the positive impact
of Leader patent stocks. The Citations Adjusted patenting is rather persistent over time but seems
essentially provided by the small rmsinventive e¤orts.
This result extent to the pharmaceutical industry the ndings of Lerner (1997) who nds that
in the disk drive industry the rms who follow the (technological) leader display the greatest
propensity to innovate. Consequently technological followers appear to be those which grant the
most patents whereas the real technological change seems to be the fruit of a non (or weak)
persistent process in the short run. Our results thus conrm the advanced hypothesis of increasing
di¢ culties to innovation in the pharmaceuticals, especially for incumbent rms who commercialize
more and more low innovative products. Such a nding could be related to diseconomies of R&D
and organizational inertia related to big laboratories.
Finally, there are implications for patent policy, particularly the questioning of the optimal
patent length as well as the optimal scope of protection o¤ered by patents. Additional follow
up research may also be considered. A rst step will be to assess the impact of our proxies of
innovation on the rmsnancial performance. Secondly, an analysis of the relationship existing
between entrant and incumbent rms is needed to fully understand the strategies that are currently
emerging in the drug industry. To this end, mergers and acquisitions and other technological
interactions between rms should also be considered.
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Appendix
Table 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS
Patenting Firms T3 (77 rms) Obs. Mean Standard Dev. Min. Max.
Sales 1085 2786.416 5362.877 0 43992.59
Market Share 1085 .5094704 .9133403 0 4.717773
R&D Expenditures 1085 283.2219 546.97 0 4833.788
Originality (mean) 1085 .0950629 .17544 0 .8175583
Citations received (nor.) 1085 78.10945 216.2227 0 2098.684
Patents 1085 5.621198 14.67009 0 115
Leader patents 1085 .4562212 1.493272 0 21
Follower patents 1085 5.164977 13.57932 0 108
Citations Share 1085 .0069771 .0186747 0 .1871287
Patent Stock 1085 25.35753 68.66387 0 536.527
Citations per Patent 1085 6.116834 13.78752 0 135
Citations stock/Patent 1085 22.92756 52.56765 0 352.5332
R&D Stock 1085 1084.876 2269.905 0 15166.15
Leader Patents Stock 1085 2.623058 7.080935 0 56.64452
Follower Patents Stock 1085 22.73448 62.20354 0 485.4362
Figure 2
100
200
300
400
500
S
el
f_
C
ita
tio
ns
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
R
at
io
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Grant Year
Ratio Self_Citations
1975-2000
Leader/Follower Patenting and Self-Citation Propensisties
Source: Authors calculations from NBER Patent Data File
38
Gautier DUFLOS: Persistence of Innovation in the US Pharmaceutical Industry
Figure 3
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Table 2 : GMM-Wooldridge Estimation
Patenting and Quality-Adjusted Patenting Propensities: Pharmaceutical Firms (1975-1991)
Non-Adjusted Patents Citations-Adjusted Patents Leaders Patents
(NA) (CA) (L)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Log (SALES)t-1 0.2758 0.2507 -0.2335 -0.2192 -0.3081 -0.3456
(0.0638)*** (0.0623)*** (0.0164)*** (0.0215)*** (0.1584)* (0.1549)**
Log (R&D)t-1 0.1846 0.2146 0.3058 0.3629 0.9776 1.0400
(0.0550)*** (0.0405)*** (0.0142)*** (0.0238)*** (0.1477)*** (0.1814)***
Market Share t-1 0.5459 0.3713 -0.2075 -0.2879 -0.2428 -0.4529
(0.0298)*** (0.0522)*** (0.0135)*** (0.0213)*** (0.3115) (0.4604)
Citations Share t-1 9.2923 6.8644 0.6351 -2.4173 47.0613 6.1456
(0.6046)*** (0.6976)*** (0.0626)*** (0.1667)*** (27.5860) (19.2542)
Originality t-1 1.6099 1.5240 0.3372 0.1583 3.5190 4.0000
(0.0985)*** (0.0729)*** (0.0106)*** (0.0278)*** (1.3130)** (0.9435)***
Self Citations t-1 0.4379 0.2014 0.1502 -0.4582 1.5176 1.1011
(0.0601)*** (0.0636)*** (0.0067)*** (0.0645)*** (1.4166) (1.1022)
GNA t-1 0.0053
(0.0005)***
GCA t-1 0.0067
(0.0001)***
GL t-1 0.1327
(0.0547)**
AR(1) -2.2778** -2.3046** -2.0369** -2.1770** -1.2404 -1.2474
AR(2) 1.4769 1.4097 -1.0756 -1.6421 0.6215 0.5661
Sargan Overid. Test 39.9866 41.4776 44.6007 43.0607 14.6936 14.7414
DOF 41 41 41 41 14 14
Number of Observations 854 854 854 854 854 854
Number of Firms 77 77 77 77 77 77
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses. GNA, GCA, GL are depreciated patents stocks.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
Estimation has been implemented using ExpEnd Gauss Code (Windmeijer, 2002).
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Table 3 : GMM-Wooldridge Estimation
Non adjusted Patenting (Persistence to Patent): Pharmaceutical Firms (1975-1991)
Non-Adjusted Patents (NA)
1 2 3 4
NA t-1 0.2194 0.2212 0.1580 0.2594
(0.0073)*** (0.0323)*** (0.0234)*** (0.0306)***
NA t-2 0.4256 0.0575 0.3308
(0.0391)*** (0.0139)*** (0.0417)***
NA t-3 0.0381 0.0027
(0.0162)** (0.0211)
NA t-4 0.2836
(0.0185)***
Log (SALES) t-1 0.2019 0.3135 0.2280 0.2746
(0.0647)** (0.0641)*** (0.0658)*** (0.0951)**
Log (R&D) t-1 0.2628 0.2893 0.3419 0.2916
(0.0574)*** (0.0675)*** (0.0675)*** (0.1035)**
Market Share t-1 0.5930 0.3881 0.5195 0.6838
(0.0557)*** (0.1234)** (0.0611)*** (0.2022)***
Citations Share t-1 3.0054 40.4953 -1.3427 8.0792
(0.2219)*** (3.2367)*** (0.7817)* (3.2081)**
Originality t-1 2.0976 2.5207 2.8708 3.3847
(0.0962)*** (0.4321)*** (0.2813)*** (0.6392)***
Self Citations t-1 -0.0624 0.2202 -0.3366 -0.6691
(0.0519) (0.2202)*** (0.0930)*** (0.2783)**
AR(1) -2.7849** -2.2537** -2.2924** -1.8295*
AR(2) 1.2923 0.2497 1.2109 0.9240
Sargan Overid. Test 43.6485 38.9202 31.5590 35.7278
DOF 42 39 36 33
Instrumental Variables 8 9 10 11
Number of Observations 854 777 700 627
Number of Firms 77 77 73 68
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
Estimation has been implemented using ExpEnd Gauss Code (Windmeijer, 2002).
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Table 4 : GMM-Wooldridge Estimation
Citations-Adjusted Patenting (Persistence to Innovate): Pharmaceutical Firms (1975-1991)
Citations-Adjusted Patents (CA)
1 2 3 4
CA t-1 0.8019 0.7674 0.8411 0.7867
(0.0037)*** (0.0035)*** (0.0032)*** (0.0039)***
CA t-2 0.0340 0.0551 0.0559
(0.0039)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0085)***
CA t-3 -0.0010 -0.0018
(0.0076) (0.0075)
CA t-4 0.0062
(0.0033)*
Log (SALES) t-1 -0.2765 -0.2470 -0.2841 -0.2431
(0.0164)*** (0.0346)*** (0.0759)*** (0.0833)**
Log (R&D) t-1 0.4746 0.4644 0.5565 0.5854
(0.0232)*** (0.0291)*** (0.0690)*** (0.0841)***
Market Share t-1 -0.4258 -0.5545 -0.6290 -0.6595
(0.0175)*** (0.0327)*** (0.0552)*** (0.0615)***
Citations Share t-1 -6.3376 -2.6953 -6.0990 -3.0237
(0.2208)*** (0.4687)*** (0.4690)*** (0.7494)***
Originality t-1 0.0269 0.2239 0.1575 0.3415
(0.0384) (0.0468)*** (0.1123) (0.1056)**
Self Citations t-1 0.0815 0.2318 0.1957 0.4766
(0.0583) (0.0565)*** (0.2039) (0.2403)*
AR(1) -2.8642** -2.6623** -2.6830** -2.5109**
AR(2) -0.7149 -1.0598 -1.2019 -1.2582
Sargan Overid. Test 46.3420 42.3981 39.8911 34.0426
DOF 42 39 36 33
Instrumental Variables 8 9 10 11
Number of Observations 854 777 700 627
Number of Firms 77 77 73 68
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
Estimation has been implemented using ExpEnd Gauss Code (Windmeijer, 2002).
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Table 5 : GMM-Wooldridge Estimation
Pioneer Patenting (Persistence to Open Tech.Path): Pharmaceutical Firms (1975-1991)
Leaders Patents (L)
1 2 3 4
Lt-1 -0.3369 -0.2749 -0.4830 -0.5379
(0.0602)*** (0.0533)*** (0.0668)*** (0.0692)***
Lt-2 -0.1150 -0.4145 -0.3880
(0.0359)*** (0.0215)*** (0.0346)***
Lt-3 -0.3304 -0.3476
(0.0274)*** (0.0272)***
Lt-4 -0.0090
(0.0446)
Log (SALES)t-1 -0.1311 -0.2205 -0.0252 -0.1372
(0.1174) (0.1665) (0.1246) (0.1217)
Log (R&D)t-1 0.7589 1.0422 0.6110 0.8674
(0.1108)*** (0.1606)*** (0.1141)*** (0.1463)***
Market Share t-1 0.7317 -0.1040 0.5331 0.3549
(0.4767) (0.3140) (0.3789) (0.3198)
Citations Share t-1 1.5049 -0.6474 1.8712 1.9788
(1.6224) (1.5049) (2.0462) (2.2969)
Originality t-1 2.9983 3.9153 1.3071 1.6606
(0.6544)*** (0.9106)*** (0.2068)*** (0.3225)***
Self Citations t-1 2.2774 0.6719 0.5079 0.1711
(0.0533)*** (0.2354)** (0.2496)** (0.2396)
AR(1) -0.9598 -0.9847 -1.3617 -1.1248
AR(2) 0.3017 0.9289 1.1675 0.6704
Sargan Overid. Test 16.0015 16.8592 19.3368 17.4663
DOF 15 14 13 12
Instrumental Variables 8 9 10 11
Number of Observations 854 777 700 627
Number of Firms 77 77 73 68
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
Estimation has been implemented using ExpEnd Gauss Code (Windmeijer, 2002).
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